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Comments
Ancillary Restraints in a Competitive Global
Economy: Does the Possibility Exist for an
Ancillary Restriction to be Reasonable in Light of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act?
When a practitioner is approached by potential clients seeking
to form a joint research and development project, the parties will
oftentimes express a desire to restrict the agreement in some man-
ner in order to recoup their initial investments. The attorney must
somehow formulate an agreement which will meet the needs of the
clients, while also staying within the limits of the law. Ancillary
restrictions to the cooperative agreement embodying the parties'
desires are frequently employed by attorneys to enable the parties
to recover the fruits of their labors.
This comment serves as a guide for the practitioner faced with
the dilemma of creating a restraint, ancillary to a legitimate joint
research and development agreement, which the courts will not
consider to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. At the outset,
this comment reviews the status of the law for analyzing the rea-
sonableness of ancillary restrictions, while also discussing the most
recent relevant decisions to determine which restraints pass muster
under the antitrust laws. In addition, conclusions are drawn as to
whether or not certain restrictions will withstand antitrust scru-
tiny, and suggestions are offered for avoiding antitrust litigation
when using ancillary restrictions.
Oftentimes, cooperation is necessary to allocate the costs associ-
ated with large-scale research and development projects and to en-
able parties to share technology peculiar to each industry. Econo-
mies of scale and start-up costs of creating new businesses and
developing new technology force competitors to join forces so as to
allow American firms to compete with international industrial and
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technological performance.
Throughout history, much concern has arisen over such coopera-
tion among firms classified as competitors. The reason being that
free market proponents are fearful that joint efforts may suppress
competition, the backbone of a free market society, even though
innovation is a product of cooperation.
The concern regarding cooperation has resulted in antitrust leg-
islation being enacted to prevent joint research efforts which may
reduce, or threaten to reduce, competition at the expense of tech-
nological advancement.' Businesspersons and scholars alike are
fearful that this legislation is stifling the incentive to develop new
technology by those parties unable to undertake the research and
development alone. Unfortunately, this fear may cripple the ability
of U.S. firms to compete in a global economy.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns "every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions... ., The Supreme Court interpreted this Act to ban all
concerted arrangements which are adopted for the purpose of re-
ducing competition, or which significantly tend to reduce competi-
tion.3 Commercial agreements which are adopted for and tend to
achieve legitimate purposes, however, are not violative of the Act
merely because of some consequential restraining effect on compe-
tition." Thus, uncertainty exists as to whether joint research agree-
ments with ancillary restrictions, which may have some restraining
effect on competition, are in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, even though the agreement fosters competition for the most
part.
A restraint is ancillary when it "contributes to the success of a
cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and out-
put."5 An ancillary restraint should be subordinate to the agree-
ment, while making the main transaction more effective in accom-
1. See for example, Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC § 1 et seq (West 1890); Clayton
Act, 15 USC § 18 (1914); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC § 41-46, 47-58 (West
1914).
2. 15USC § 1.
3. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v United States, 246 US 231 (1918).
4. National Bancard Corp. v VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F Supp 1231 (S D Fla 1984),
afr'd, 779 F2d 592 (1986), cert denied, 479 US 923 (1986).
5. Polk Bros., Inc. v Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F2d 185, 189 (7th Cir 1985).
See also, Business Electronics Corp. v Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 US 717 (1988) (ancil-




plishing the objectives of the cooperation.0 However, a restraint
that is not related to the goals of the main transaction, or is so
broad that it suppresses competition without creating any procom-
petitive effects, is not ancillary.
The courts have encountered various forms of ancillary restric-
tions. Ancillary restraints are usually either horizontal (agreements
among competitors restricting the way in which they will compete
with each other) or vertical (agreements between firms in different
stages of the chain of distribution that restrict conditions under
which the parties may purchase, sell, or resell goods).7 Occasion-
ally, the restraint is a combination of the two. Vertical nonprice
restraints are often used by a manufacturer to protect its invest-
ment in the service and promotion of its brands from others who
do not make such investments, but cut their prices in order to take
advantage of the manufacturer's investment (the so-called "free-
rider" problem).8 Covenants not to compete, i.e., covenants re-
stricting what products may be sold and in what areas, are fre-
quently included so as to preserve the quality of the specific bar-
gain. Similarly, territorial restrictions are often used to protect
parties' interests in an area to which they have a legitimate claim.
Secrecy agreements are considered to be reasonable ancillary re-
strictions when used to protect a party's technological knowledge
or goodwill contributed in joint development programs. Other ex-
amples of ancillary restrictions include boycotts,9 bans on competi-
tive bidding, and blanket licenses."0
I. REASONABLENESS OF RESTRAINrs
A. Illegal Per Se
Generally, section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns all arrange-
6. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F2d 210 (D C Cir 1986),
cert denied, 479 US 1033 (1987).
7. American Floral Services, Inc. v Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n, 633 F Supp
201, 217 (N D I1 1986).
8. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Oper-
ations (1988). For example, manufacturers entering new markets may use the restrictions
which limit who may sell the products so as to induce retailers to make the necessary invest-
ments to distribute the products. Continental TV Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 US 36
(1977).
9. A boycott is defined as a concerted refusal to deal on particular terms with other
competitors. Black's Law Dictionary 169 (West, 6th ed 1990).
10. Blanket licenses are agreements by which individuals grant a single person or
entity the right to license their products or technology to others. Broadcast Music, Inc. v
CBS, 441 US 1 (1979).
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ments that have a significant tendency to reduce competition.
Those agreements which are plainly anticompetitive and "lack any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused." 1 These naked restraints are said to be
illegal per se since they deny customers the opportunity to choose
freely in a competitive economy.'
The inquiry as to whether a restriction is a per se violation of
the Sherman Act depends on whether the practice facially appears
to be one that would always, or almost always, tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.13 Price-fixing is the foremost ex-
ample of a restriction which is illegal per se, regardless of whether
the arrangement is structured as horizontal or vertical;" however,
not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that
have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act.ls
B. Rule of Reason
1. Overview of Section 1
Although section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract
in restraint of trade, only those restrictions which unreasonably re-
strain trade are struck down." Since the early years of this cen-
tury, courts have considered this "Rule of Reason" to be the pre-
vailing standard of analysis for determining the reasonableness of a
restraint. 7 Essentially, the inquiry under the Rule of Reason is to
determine "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.' '"I This analysis
11. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v United State, 356 US 1 (1958).
12. See United States v Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F2d 1351 (5th Cir 1980); North-
rop Corp. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F2d 1030 (9th Cir 1983), cert denied, 464 US 849
(1983).
13. Sewell Plastics, Inc. v Coca-Cola Co., 720 F Supp 1196, 1217 (W D NC 1989). A
tying agreement (where the sale of one product is made on the condition that another prod-
uct is also purchased) is an example of a restriction usually considered to be illegal per se.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v CBS, 441 US 1 (1979); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v United
States, 356 US 1 (1958).
14. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
15. Broadcast Music, 441 US at 23 (restriction with an impact on price was necessary
to economize the procedures for licensing musical scores).
16. Standard Oil, 221 US at 60.
17. Id.
18. National Society of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679 (1978)
(quoting Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231 (1918)). See note 41 and
accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the Rule of Reason.
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is employed to form a judgment about the competitive side of the
restraint. The conclusion that the restraint is unreasonable may be
based either on
1) the nature or character of the contracts or
2) surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference that they were in-
tended to restrain trade and enhance prices.'
Thus, the fundamental inquiry is whether the challenged restraint
suppresses or enhances competition."'
2. Application of the Rule of Reason to Ancillary Restraints
As early as 1899, the courts recognized the need for ancillary re-
straints to legitimate agreements in order to promote such agree-
ments or to protect business interests. A Sixth Circuit Court ar-
ticulated what is known today as the doctrine of ancillary
restraints:
In]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant em-
bodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract and
necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits
of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those
fruits by the other party."1
Much ado has been made as to whether ancillary restrictions are
per se unlawful. In 1972, in United States v Topco Associates,
Inc.,22 the Supreme Court condemned all horizontal ancillary re-
straints as illegal per se, without considering whether they were
reasonable or ancillary to a legitimate purpose.2 3 In rejecting the
argument that the horizontal territorial restrictions used in Topco
were necessary to foster competition among private label brands,
the Court stressed its inability to weigh a decrease in competition
in one sector against the procompetitive consequences achieved in
another sector.2' The Court would rather have seen competitors
"cut each other's throats" than allow any limitation on the free
market, even though significant procompetitive effects were likely
19. NCAA v Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 US 85 (1984); Society of
Professional Engineers, 435 US at 690. See also, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures (1980).
20. NCAA, 468 US at 103; Society of Professional Engineers, 435 US at 690.
21. United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F 271, 282 (6th Cir 1898), modi-
fied and afld, 175 US 211 (1899).
22. 405 US 596 (1972).
23. Topco, 405 US at 597, 608.
24. Id at 607.
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to result from the use of the restraint." This decision was probably
due in part to the view that the benefit of doing a case-by-case
analysis of the reasonableness of each restraint would not outweigh
the tremendous expense of such an endeavor.
More recently, the Court rejected the broad application of the
per se rule to horizontal ancillary restraints and stated that the
reasonableness of the restraint is determinative.2 The modern
trend is towards such an analysis for all forms of ancillary re-
straints in order to consider the economic impact, which may not
be immediately obvious in certain arrangements.27 Notably, in
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v Atlas Van Lines, Inc.," the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that, in
Broadcast Music2" and NCAA,"* the Supreme Court had effec-
tively overruled Topco as to the per se illegality of all horizontal
restraints and had returned to the ancillary restraint doctrine for-
mulated in Addyston Pipe."1
In United States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,32 the Supreme Court
reinvigorated the per se rule of illegality for vertical non-price re-
straints by applying the per se rule to intrabrand competition
which was viewed as harmful, while concluding that interbrand
competition was conducive to a free economy and, therefore,
should be judged under the Rule of Reason.33 In 1977, the Su-
preme Court overruled Schwinn and its distinction between forms
of competition in Continental T.V. v G.T.E. Sylvania,3 and stated
that new manufacturers may need vertical restrictions in order to
induce retailers to make necessary capital and labor investments.35
25. Id at 611.
26. See Broadcast Music, 441 US at 23-25.
27. See NCAA, 468 US at 100; McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d at 1052; VISA U.S.A.,
596 F Supp at 1252; Lektro- Vend Corp. v Vendo Co., 660 F2d 255, 265 (7th Cir 1981), cert
denied, 455 US 921 (1982); Polk Bros., 776 F2d at 190; Sewel Plastics, Inc. v Coca-Cola Co.,
720 F Supp 1196, 1217 (W D NC 1989).
28. 792 F2d 210 (D C Cir 1986), cert denied, 479 US 1033 (1987) (the court deter-
mined that carrier agents which agreed to use pooling agreements to govern business rela-
tionships between a van line and a carrier agent were not group boycotts and, therefore,
were not unreasonable restraints of trade).
29. 441 US 1 (1979).
30. 468 US 85 (1984). See note 93 and accompanying text for discussion of NCAA.
31. Rothery Storage, 792 F2d at 229. See note 21 and accompanying text for text of
the doctrine of ancillary restraints.
32. 388 US 365 (1967), overruled in Continental T.V. v G.T.E. Sylvania (cited in
note 34).
33. Schwinn, 388 US 365.
34. 433 US 36 (1977).
35. Sylvania, 433 US at 55.
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Thus, the Court reverted to the standard articulated in North. Pa-
cific R. Co.3 6 to determine whether vertical restrictions should be
conclusively presumed to be illegal and concluded that the Rule of
Reason should definitely govern vertical restrictions.
3 7
Courts have also hesitated to classify a restraint as illegal per se
when the courts have no considerable experience with the business
relationships associated with the restriction." In addition, the De-
partment of Justice has recognized that restraints ancillary to a
legitimate joint venture hold significant potential for creating
procompetitive consequences and, therefore, analyzes them under
the Rule of Reason." Moreover, the courts have recently stated
that there is today a presumption in favor of applying the Rule of
Reason.4 0 Although the Supreme Court has managed to skirt the
issue as to whether the Rule of Reason always applies when exam-
ining ancillary restrictions, the general consensus of the courts and
the modern trend is toward its application to all types of ancillary
restrictions.
3. Rule of Reason Test
In order to resolve whether the restraint is reasonable, the Rule
of Reason basically requires the factfinder to determine whether,
under the circumstances, the anticompetitive consequences of a
particular action or arrangement are outweighed by its procompe-
titive effects.4 1 Thus, even though a restriction may suppress com-
petition or restrain trade to some degree, it may be necessary to
protect a legitimate business purpose.
36. The standard set forth by the Court in North. Pacific R. Co. is whether the re-
straint has a "pernicious effect on competition" or lacks any "redeeming virtue." North
Pacific, 356 US at 5. See also note 11 and accompanying text.
37. Sylvania, 433 US at 57.
38. See National Bank of Canada v Interbank Card Ass'n., 507 F Supp 1113 (S D
NY 1980), afl'd, 666 F2d 6 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d at 1051; Broadcast Music,
441 US at 9-10.
39. Antitrust Division, International Operations (cited in note 8). See notes 16-18
and accompanying text for discussion of the Rule of Reason test.
40. See Sharp, 485 US at 726 (the Supreme Court recognized that the scope of per se
illegality should be narrow in the context of vertical restrictions and stated that its decision
to find such a restraint not to be a per se violation was guided by the presumption).
41. Sewell Plastics, 720 F Supp at 1217; NCAA, 468 US at 103; Society of Profes-
sional Engineers, 435 US at 691; Lektro- Vend, 660 F2d at 268. Relevant circumstances may
include a number of various factors such as "the parties' intentions and purposes in adopt-
ing the restriction, the structure of and competitive conditions within the affected industry,
the relative competitive positions of the parties, and the presence of economic barriers in-
hibiting the ability of competitors to respond and offset the challenged practices." William
C. Holmes, 1990 Antitrust Law Handbook at 135 (Clark Boardman Co., 1990).
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The elements of the Rule of Reason analysis are anything but
clear. What is clear, however, is that the old rules of per se illegal-
ity, which strike down restrictions without considering their rea-
sonableness, are arbitrary and should only be applied after a view
of the facts reveals a naked restraint on competition. While some
clarity exists for vertical restraints, some uncertainty exists in ana-
lyzing horizontal restrictions on cooperative efforts under the anti-
trust laws today."'
The Department of Justice issues guidelines to advise the busi-
ness and legal communities of the general legal and economic anal-
ysis it implements in making prosecutorial decisions under the an-
titrust laws. The basic test for collateral restrictions on joint
ventures have been set forth as follows:
1) Is the restraint ancillary to a lawful main purpose?
2) Is the restraint's scope and duration no greater than is necessary to
achieve that purpose?
3) Is the restraint otherwise reasonable alone or in conjunction with other
circumstances?"
Since vertical nonprice restraints on joint ventures hold the po-
tential for generating procompetitive consequences, the Depart-
ment of Justice has specifically stated that these restraints could
only facilitate prohibited collusion when each of the following
three necessary market conditions exists:
1) the market where collusion may occur is highly concentrated at the time
the restriction becomes effective;
2) the parties imposing the restraint must account for most sales in that
market; and
3) entry into the market is difficult."
The first two conditions require an examination into the market
power of the parties. Unless the parties are able to control the
market, it is unlikely they will be able to exclude new entrants
from the market and gain a noteworthy return from use of the re-
striction. If entry into the market is not foreclosed or made signifi-
cantly more difficult and costly, new entrants could easily enter
and undercut prices of any attempted collusion. The Department
of Justice considers a firm with a small market share (e.g., ten per-
42. Joe Sims, Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 Antitrust LJ 433
(1989).
43. See Anti Div, Joint Ventures (cited in note 19); Anti Div, International Opera-
tions (cited in note 8).
44. Anti Div, International Operations at 56-7 (cited in note 8).
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cent or less) to be unable to construct barriers to entry significant
enough to create anticompetitive effects, and so normally does not
challenge the small firm's use of a vertical nonprice restraint.
8
If a showing is made of the existence of all three conditions that
indicate collusion, the Department will consider certain other fac-
tors which would tend to create greater anticompetitive conse-
quences. These factors include the following: the duration and re-
strictiveness of the restraint; any direct evidence of
anticompetitive intent; whether the restraint actually has had an
exclusionary effect; and whether market conditions are conducive
to collusion or anticompetitive exclusion. " Any anticompetitive ef-
fects are weighed against procompetitive consequences in order to
determine the validity of the restriction under the Rule of Reason.
4. Application of the Rule of Reason
a. Relevant Market and Market Power
The starting point for any Rule of Reason inquiry is usually the
identification of the relevant market, which involves an assessment
of both the relevant product and geographical markets. The next
step is to determine whether the parties to the agreement have
market power sufficient to have a real adverse effect on competi-
tion. Market power is the ability to raise prices above those that
would be charged in a competitive market.47 However, those agree-
ments involving parties with little or no market power are rarely
found to be anticompetitive. "Unless [the parties to the agree-
ment] have the power to raise prices by curtailing output, their
agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, and it makes sense to
understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial.'4 If reasona-
ble substitutes for the product or service at issue are available in
the market, the market power may be severely undercut. In com-
parison, a unique commodity provides correspondingly higher mar-
ket power.
45. Anti Div, International Operations at 61 (cited in note 8).
46. Anti Div, International Operations at 62 (cited in note 8).
47. NCAA, 468 US at 109, n.38; Sewell Plastics, 720 F Supp at 1218 (citing NCAA).
48. Polk Bros., 776 F2d at 191. See also, Bi-Rite Oil Co. v Indiana Farm Bureau
Assoc., 720 F Supp 1363 (S D Ind 1989) (since evidence indicated that defendants did not
have the ability to control output and prices, and, therefore, did not have market power to





If the possessed market power is sufficient to invite inquiry,
other anticompetitive factors are given significant consideration
under a Rule of Reason analysis. One such anticompetitive effect is
the elimination of a potentially significant new market entrant
with the capability, incentive and actual intention to enter the
market when creating a joint venture.4 ' Any agreement which at-
tempts to suppress or destroy competition, or whereby the parties
attempt to control prices, is said to have significant anticompeti-
tive effects.50
c. Procompetitive Effects
The next step in a Rule of Reason analysis is for a court to con-
sider whether any procompetitive justifications exist for the use of
the restrictions at issue, assuming a showing of actual adverse ef-
fect on competition has been made. Courts often assess, among
other factors, the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effect, the his-
tory of the restraint, and the reasons for adopting it.'"
Oftentimes, circumstances may indicate that, but for the use of
such a restriction, neither party acting alone could have developed
the product. This suggests potential procompetitive effects."2
Where the evidence indicates that the parties had not intended to
use a restriction to thwart competition, but instead, to attract re-
search and development participants into a project where pooling
of resources and technology was essential, courts are inclined to
allow such a restriction. In many cases, the alternative to joint de-
velopment would be no development at all.
53
49. Yamaha Motor Co. v FTC, 657 F2d 971, 978 (8th Cir 1981), cert denied, 456 US
915 (1982).
50. See for example, In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System,
720 F Supp 1068 (S D NY 1989) (a competitor failed to show that the use of liquidated
damages, minimum use and rollover clauses actually suppressed or destroyed competition).
51. Lektro-Vend, 660 F2d at 268; National Bank of Canada, 507 F Supp at 1122.
52. See McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d at 1052; Realty, 629 F2d at 1368.
53. Berkey Photo. Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F2d 263, 302 (2d Cir 1979). See
also, VISA U.S.A., 596 F Supp at 1252; Sylvania, 433 US at 55; National Bank of Canada,
507 F Supp at 1123; Polk Bros., 776 F2d at 190; NCAA, 468 US at 101-02; Salem M. Katsh,





A consideration for parties entertaining the thought of including
an ancillary restriction in their agreement is whether a party exists
who may seek to have the restriction struck down as violative of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. While persons may claim that the
restraint suppresses competition, only parties with standing may
lawfully bring an antitrust claim.
In order for the complaining party to be sufficiently aggrieved to
have standing to bring an antitrust claim, the party must have suf-
fered an "antitrust injury" from another party's use of a restric-
tion, which injury entitles the complaining party to relief." When
the injury is to competition and of the type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent, a party has suffered an "antitrust injury.""6
b. Reasonably Necessary Test
Courts evaluate ancillary restraints on the basis of whether they
are "reasonably necessary" to achievement of legitimate business
purposes." When using a Rule of Reason analysis, the "least re-
strictive alternative" test is not determinative. In order to prevail
under the more difficult "least restrictive alternative" test, the par-
ties to the agreement are required to show that the restraint used
was the least restrictive, there being no other restriction available
that would have a lesser adverse impact on competition." Most
courts agree that the "[a]pplication of the rigid 'no less restrictive
alternative' test would place an undue burden on the ordinary con-
duct of business," and instead apply the "reasonably necessary"
test.6
c. National Cooperative Research Act
In 1984, in an effort to promote joint research and development
projects, Congress formulated its desire to allow these projects,
some of which may have anticompetitive consequences, to go for-
54. Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 US 477 (1977) (the Court held
that the plaintiff had not suffered "antitrust injury" of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent).
55. Brunswick, 429 US at 489.
56. See Eastman Kodak, 603 F2d at 303; Sewell Plastics, 720 F Supp at 1219; VISA
U.S.A., 596 F Supp at 1257.
57. VISA U.S.A., 596 F Supp at 1257.
58. Id.




ward without the fear of antitrust litigation by enacting the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA").s° The threat of anti-
trust claims against a joint research cooperative and the resulting
treble damages imposed when found in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act often create a significant barrier to such research.
For this reason, a wasteful duplication of effort has hindered the
ability of United States firms to compete in a global economy, an
economy which thrives on technological advances.
Under NCRA, innovative joint efforts which fall within the defi-
nition "joint research and development ventures"" are assured to
be analyzed under the Rule of Reason if suit is later brought,
thereby avoiding being struck down as illegal per se." For exam-
ple, should a research and development program that was regis-
tered with the Department of Justice pursuant to this Act be
found to violate the antitrust laws, the recoverable damages are
limited to actual damages, no treble damages being imposed."'
Through the use of this Act, Congress intends to improve the qual-
ity and amount of research and development being performed in
the United States by lessening the likelihood of an antitrust claim
prevailing.
Congress has made a step in the right direction by enacting
NCRA, but unfortunately, has not sufficiently assured innovators
that the United States is a hospitable environment for strategic
alliances and cooperative arrangements. NCRA has been criticized
for not being permissive enough to entice joint manufacturing and
production of innovative products and processes, as these neces-
60. National Cooperative Research Act, 15 USC §§ 4301 et seq (West 1984).
61. "Joint research and development venture" includes, in relevant part:
any group of activities. . . by two or more persons for the purpose of- .
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings ... into practical application for
experimental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental produc-
tion and testing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or
(E) any combination of [the above]
but does not include:
(1) exchanging information ... that is not reasonably required to conduct the re-
search and development ...
(2) entering into an agreement .. .restricting, requiring or otherwise involving the
production or marketing . . . of any product, process, or service . ., that is not rea-
sonably required to prevent misappropriation of proprietary information contributed.
15 USC § 4301.
62. 15 USC § 4302.
63. 15 USC § 4303.
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sary cooperatives are not covered by the Act." Moreover, no guid-
ance is given as to how to apply the Rule of Reason test, which is
replete with ambiguities. 6 In addition, while treble damages are
not imposed upon a joint effort registered under the Act, this does
not guarantee that no litigation will result. The costs of defending
an antitrust claim are often substantial enough to be a deterrent,
even without the threat of treble damages."
II. CASE LAW HISTORY OF ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
Recently, courts have consistently been applying the Rule of
Reason to determine whether ancillary restrictions to joint re-
search and development programs are reasonable under section 1
of the Sherman Act. Since some confusion exists as to whether the
Rule of Reason is to be applied to all ancillary restrictions, courts
have been careful to first dismiss the possibility that application of
the per se rule is required before determining whether the restraint
is reasonable.
Even though in two decisions, Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman
Kodak Co.67 and Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v FTC," ancillary re-
strictions to legitimate business purposes were struck down as vio-
lative of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts were applying
the Rule of Reason in reaching their conclusions that the restraints
were unreasonable. In Eastman Kodak, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a secrecy agreement an-
cillary to a project to jointly develop camera devices violated sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.6" At first glance it appears that the
court may still have been inclined to find all ancillary restrictions
unreasonable even after the overturning of Schwinn.70 A closer
reading of the case, however, reveals that, by requiring nondisclo-
sure, Kodak had kept a desirable innovation off the market for two
years solely for its own benefit.7 1 Also, Kodak's market power, a
64. Thomas Jorde and David Teece, Acceptable Cooperation Among Competitors in
the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 Antitrust W 529 (ABA 1989).
65. Jorde, 58 Antitrust W at 546.
66. Id.
67. 603 F2d 263 (2d Cir 1979).
68. 657 F2d 971 (8th Cir 1981).
69. Eastman Kodak, 603 F2d 263 (2d Cir 1986).
70. See notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text for the discussion concerning
Schwinn.
71. Eastman Kodak, 603 F2d at 302. The parties to the agreement had not actually
jointly invested in this project, another party having separately researched and developed
the product, which was the basis of the secrecy agreement, before approaching Kodak. Id.
1991
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significant factor as viewed by the court, was being used to prevent
other camera makers from competing with Kodak."2 Thus, the
court concluded that the ancillary secrecy agreement requested by
Kodak was merely intended to suppress competition. 3 At the same
time, the court stressed that it was not holding this joint develop-
ment restriction to be a per se violation of section 1.74 Although
this restriction was found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade,
the court noted the realistic need of contributors to restrict to
themselves the rewards of innovation."
In Yamaha, restrictions as to sales markets used by the parties
were found to be collateral to the legitimate joint venture to pro-
duce outboard motors and, therefore, illegal under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.'1 A thorough examination of the
facts revealed that the market restrictions on the research and de-
velopment joint venture were extended to non-joint venture mo-
tors and consequently, these restraints were not "reasonably neces-
sary" to the purpose of the joint venture." Instead, the parties
were attempting to carve up the market for their own benefit.'
8
Such an agreement unreasonably foreclosed competition and
served only to eliminate possible competition between the
parties."
An exclusivity provision raised antitrust issues in National Bank
of Canada v Interbank Card Ass'n.8 This vertical restriction was a
result of negotiations between two parties seeking to develop and
establish an organization for extending credit in order to create a
Canadian credit card market.81 In order to protect and recover the
major investment necessary to allow them to compete with the
72. Id at 301-02.
73. Id.
74. Id at 302.
75. Id at 301.
76. 657 F2d 971 (8th Cir 1981). Notably, although this claim was brought under sec-
tion 5 (Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(c), 15 USC § 45(e)), the court applied the same
reasoning as is used in a section 1 analysis. Yamaha, 657 F2d 971.
77. Id at 981.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 507 F Supp 1113 (S D NY 1980). The exclusivity provision was divided into three
periods, the first period being that time during which both parties' consent was required to
grant a license to any Canadian entity so that it could become a member of the credit sys-
tem. United States entities were allowed to enter the system without such consent during
the second period. During the final period, consent by the parties could not be denied to a
Canadian entity which agreed to expend a reasonable share of start-up costs. National Bank




VISA system, the parties agreed to exclude entry" into their Cana-
dian credit system for an eight-year period, the time period calcu-
lated to recover start-up costs.83 The court stated that in light of
its purpose to enhance competition and the moderate duration of
the restriction which was necessary to recover expenses, the ancil-
lary restraint was reasonable and not violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act."
Using an analysis similar to that employed in National Bank of
Canada, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a
covenant not to compete in an employment contract was reasona-
ble under the Rule of Reason. 8' The court rejected an argument
that the covenants were executed primarily to eliminate the new
hire as a competitor. Instead, the court found the restriction to be
justified since the party seeking to enforce the covenant had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting its goodwill and trade secrets." Also
stressed by the court was the fact that the covenant occurred
within a reasonable geographic area and time period, with limita-
tions as to what products were restricted."7
A case illustrative of the courts' interest in propagating the in-
centive of parties to pool resources in joint research and develop-
ment projects in order to attract venture participants is Northrop
Corp. v McDonnell Douglas Corp.'s This case involved a teaming
agreement to build a new type of jet. The agreement included a
restriction that was subjected to antitrust scrutiny.es This restric-
tion limited Northrop to marketing land-based aircraft and Mc-
Donnell to marketing those aircraft suitable for aircraft carrier op-
erations.90 While the court did not actually apply the Rule of
Reason, the tone of the court suggested that the restriction was
reasonable.91 This is evident from the court's emphasis on the fact
82. See note 80 for the terms of the exclusivity provision.
83. Id.
84. Id at 1122, 1123.
85. Lektro-Vend Corp. v Vendo Co., 660 F2d 255 (7th Cir 1981) (cited in note 27).
86. Lektro-Vend, 660 F2d at 266.
87. Id at 267. The employment contract prohibited the new hire from entering into
the vending machine business, the trade of the employer, within the employer's territories
for a period of five years from the termination of employment. Id at 258, 259.
88. 705 F2d 1030 (9th Cir 1982).
89. McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d at 1037, 1038.
90. Id at 1038. The use of such restrictions is common in the defense industry and
"serves the purposes of spreading financial risk, pooling technological know-how, and raising
sufficient resources to complete costly developmental research." Holmes, 1990 Handbook at
370 (cited in note 41).
91. McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d at 1053. On appeal, the court was restricted to de-
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that this teaming agreement allowed both parties to compete in a
market from which they would have otherwise been foreclosed. 2
By the time McDonnell Douglas was decided in 1982, courts
throughout the United States were consistently applying the Rule
of Reason to ancillary restraints. Yet, numerous courts still felt
compelled to discuss and subsequently reject the application of the
per se rule of illegality to certain types of restrictions before exam-
ining a restraint under the Rule of Reason. In 1984, the Supreme
Court examined an ancillary restraint to collegiate activities in
NCAA v Board of Regents,93 but no general holding as to the ap-
plicability of the Rule of Reason was set forth by the Court." The
restriction at issue was a horizontal agreement regulating televised
athletic events in hopes of preserving attendance at football games
and the overall collegiate athletic system.9"
Rejecting an argument to apply the per se rule, the Court ana-
lyzed the ancillary restraint implemented by the NCAA under the
Rule of Reason. In striking down the agreement, the Court found
that the anticompetitive limitation on price and output was not
sufficiently offset by any procompetitive effects." However, the
Court did not broadly declare that the Rule of Reason was always
to be applied to ancillary restraints. Instead, the Court stated that
an application of a per se rule to this situation would be inappro-
priate because the NCAA is an industry in which horizontal re-
straints on competition are essential if the product is to be availa-
ble at all.97 The Court conceded that some type of restraint may be
necessary to preserve and encourage intercollegiate amateur athlet-
ics and may actually enhance market-wide competition." But here,
the Court stated, the NCAA was merely insulating collegiate foot-
ball with this particular restraint so that it would not have to com-
pete in the free market."9
The Court also determined that the restraints on football tele-
casts were significantly different from other justifiable means of
fostering competition. 00 The television plan was found not to be
termining only whether the marketing restraint was illegal per se. Id.
92. Id.
93. 468 US 85 (1984).
94. NCAA, 468 US at 85.
95. Id at 99.
96. Id at 114.
97. Id at 101.
98. Id at 102-03.
99. Id at 105-06.
100. Id at 117. The Court suggested a number of justifiable means of fostering compe-
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an effective attempt to equalize competition throughout the
NCAA.10 1 Also considered was the fact that no similar restriction
was required to promote another analogous sport, college basket-
ball.10' In striking down this agreement, the Court concluded that
intercollegiate football was unnecessarily restricted and not en-
hanced by the television restraint.
1 08
Shortly after NCAA was decided, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida considered the findings
of the Supreme Court in NCAA and the necessity of certain re-
straints in joint ventures to conclude that the Rule of Reason
should govern the determination of validity of the interchange fee
used by VISA in National Bancard Corp. v VISA U.S.A. 10" Upon
review, the court decided that the interchange fee was a reasonable
charge by the parties to transfer credit card transactions through-
out the credit system network and that the network yielded effi-
ciencies beneficial to the economy.10 6 The court stressed the fact
that the fee was negotiable and discretionary, customers being free
to make alternate arrangements. In weighing the procompetitive
effects against the anticompetitive consequences, the court consid-
ered the nonexistent market power of the parties, the lack of barri-
ers to entry in the credit market and the investment of the parties
into the joint venture, thereby concluding that the balance clearly
tipped in favor of reasonableness.'"
Oftentimes, a party to an agreement with an ancillary restriction
will refuse to honor the agreement, asserting as a defense in
breaching the agreement that the covenant is invalid under section
1 of the Sherman Act. In Polk Bros. Inc. v Forest City Enterprises,
Inc.,07 two appliance retailers agreed to combine resources to con-
struct a building to house both businesses so that the two stores
could offer a full line of home furnishings.'" The parties included
in the agreement a covenant which restricted the products each
tition, including rules defining the contests, the eligibility of participants, and the manner in
which responsibilities would be shared. Id at 117-18.
101. Id at 119.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 596 F Supp at 1231. VISA, a for-profit non-stock-membership corporation, ac-
cepted eligible financial institutions as members and exchanged their transactional papers
for credit purposes. A fee charged by VISA for this service was set by a cost analysis system.
VISA members, however, were free to interchange paper through other credit services. Id.
105. Id at 1263.
106. Id at 1259.
107. 776 F2d 185 (7th Cir 1985).
108. Polk Bros., 776 F2d at 187.
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could sell.'" a Years later, one party, concerned about declining
profits, notified the other party of its intent not to honor the cove-
nant, arguing that the covenant was invalid.110 The court distin-
guished this ancillary restriction as part of a larger endeavor which
actually promoted efficiency and productivity from a naked re-
straint designed to suppress competition. "' The court discussed
how cooperation, common to joint ventures, mergers, and systems
of distribution, often facilitates market efficiencies and concluded
that a Rule of Reason focus was appropriate." 2 Finding that one
party "would not have entered into this arrangement, however, un-
less it had received assurances that [the other party] would not
compete with it in the sale of products that are the 'foundation of
[its] business,'" and recognizing the benefits of cooperation, the
court set forth the analytical framework for the factfinder to follow
upon remand under the Rule of Reason."
3
In yet another noteworthy decision, Sewell Plastics, Inc. v Coca-
Cola Co.,"" the District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina stressed the need to examine market power when weigh-
ing competitive effects in order to determine the reasonableness of
vertical supply contracts used to economize the plastic bottle pro-
duction and distribution process.1 5 In order to reduce packaging
costs and better compete with other bottlers, a manufacturing co-
operative of bottlers was formed so the parties could produce bot-
tles for themselves." 6 The manufacturer who had previously sold
the bottles to the parties claimed that these contracts were unrea-
sonable restraints of trade.""
In deciding that the supply contracts were reasonable, the court
found that, not only had bottle prices decreased and production of
bottles increased, but that market concentration had decreased
since the cooperative was formed." 8 Also, the court found that the
cooperative probably could not have increased its market share
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 189-90.
112. Id at 189.
113. Id at 190. The discussion of the court suggested that the restraint was reasonable.
Id.
114. 720 F Supp 1196 (W D NC 1989).
115. Sewell Plastics, 720 F Supp at 1218.
116. Id at 1208. To justify the investment in plant and equipment, the bottlers exe-
cuted supply contracts to purchase 80% of their bottle requirements for five years, with a
price being set by the cooperation for the first year of production. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id at 1210-12.
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materially in the future, and therefore could not have had suffi-
cient market power to control prices so as to have an actual ad-
verse impact on competition.11'
In dicta, the court went on to consider whether any procompeti-
tive effects actually existed in the event that the complaining party
made a showing of anticompetitive consequences.1 20 In doing so,
the court merely examined whether the contracts were a reasona-
bly justified means of achieving legitimate ends (as opposed to the
least restrictive means).12 1 The court dismissed the claims, how-
ever, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, but only for failure to
establish anticompetitive effects resulting form the cooperative's
supply contracts.'22
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR AvOIDING ANTITRUST LITIGATION
In light of the above review of applicable decisions, any investi-
gation into the validity of a particular ancillary restriction would
most certainly be performed under the Rule of Reason. Should the
complaining party allege that the restriction is illegal per se, the
parties to the agreement should refer to the discussion above in
support of the application of the Rule of Reason.
Under the Rule of Reason, in order for the ancillary restriction
included in the joint development agreement to withstand anti-
trust inquiry it must either have no anticompetitive effects or, if
such effects exist, they must be outweighed by the procompetitive
effects of the agreement. In arguing that the restriction is not an-
ticompetitive and does not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the parties to the agreement should rely primarily on those cases
in which two or more parties worked jointly to develop a techno-
logical innovation where pooling of technology and resources was
required.' Those cases suggest that, in general, courts are willing
to allow parties to restrain trade to a certain extent in order to
119. Id at 1213. The cooperative's 3.6% share of the market could grow, at most, to
40% of the market, that share of the soft drink market possessed by the bottlers. The court
concluded that the complaining party had failed to show that the bottlers, with this per-
centage market share, possessed sufficient market power to control prices. Id.
120. Id at 1219.
121. Id. See notes 56-9 and accompanying text for discussion of the "reasonably neces-
sary" and "least restrictive alternative" tests.
122. Sewell Plastics, 720 F Supp at 1222.
123. See for example McDonnell Douglas, 705 F2d 1030 (9th Cir 1982); VISA U.S.A,
596 F Supp 1231 (S D Fla. 1984); National Bank of Canada, 507 F Supp 1113 (S D NY




provide the necessary incentive for parties to undertake costly de-
velopmental projects. Looking to the principal purpose for impos-
ing the restrictions, the courts concluded that the restrictions were
not naked restraints of trade, but were intended to enable the par-
ties to successfully launch a new venture while protecting the fruits
of their labors.
Another concern of the courts is the market power possessed by
the parties imposing the restrictions. The courts agree, for the
most part, that without market power, parties are unable to ad-
versely impact the economy by the use of ancillary restrictions.
Therefore, careful consideration should be given when parties with
great market power are desirous of including an ancillary restric-
tion in the joint agreement.
In addition, the parties should avoid making the same mistakes
as those parties whose restrictions, ancillary to a joint project, were
struck down as unreasonable. " Eastman Kodak and Yamaha are
two premiere examples of what types of restrictions should not be
adopted by contracting parties. Where the parties do not limit the
agreement to the subject of the research project, but instead ex-
tend the restrictions to other anticompetitive purposes (as was the
case in Yamaha), the courts will not hesitate to find the restraints
to be violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In Eastman Kodak, the parties attempted to keep an innovative
product off the market merely to allow Kodak to realize profits on
another newly introduced product. The court emphasized its dis-
approval with the resulting loss to consumers created solely by Ko-
dak. Those courts also made clear that labeling an agreement as a
joint venture is not enough to ensure that any restraints of trade
imposed by parties to the agreement will be considered reasonable.
Therefore, an analysis of these two cases indicates that restraints,
which on their face may appear to be necessary to a legitimate bus-
iness purpose, still may be found to be unreasonable if a closer
examination of the facts reveals that the restrictions were intended
to merely suppress competition or if other significantly less an-
ticompetitive means were available to achieve the goals of the
project.
Where a necessary incentive to induce the parties to undertake
such a large scale development project is required, so long as the
restriction is of a reasonable time duration and geographical area,
124. In Eastman Kodak and Yamaha, discussed at notes 67 and 68, respectively, the
court struck down ancillary restrictions as unreasonable.
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the ancillary restraint will probably be considered reasonable. A
further consideration is the barrier to entry. Where no barrier ex-
ists, competition is great and ancillary restraints are more likely to
be seen as reasonable than if no other parties could enter the mar-
ket and compete.
In conclusion, in today's fast-paced, hi-tech environment, the
ability of the United States to compete in a global economy hinges
on American businesses taking the risks and investing the capital
necessary to undertake research and development projects. Parties
will not commit themselves to agreements to develop innovative
products if the benefits of such projects are lost in defending
against antitrust claims. In light of the legislature's response in en-
acting research and development incentives and the courts' trend
towards considering the reasonableness of restraints on the parties'
agreements, the necessary backdrop is set for parties to reap the
benefits of such an investment. Therefore, so long as parties are
careful to ensure that ancillary restriction incorporated into the
agreements are reasonable, the fear of antitrust litigation and po-
tential penalties should not erect too formidable a barrier to joint
research and development.
Claire E. Trunzo
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